UIC

REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

IT’S A PIRATE’S LIFE FOR ME: STEALING SCRIPTS INSTEAD OF JEWELS
ALEXA BUECHLER
ORCID: 0000-0003-1033-7208
ABSTRACT
When Arthur L. Alfred, II and his co-Plaintiffs sued Disney for copyright infringement
for Disney’s Pirates of the Caribbean franchise, the parties represented a modern-day
David and Goliath. Disney is Goliath, with its ownership of big-name companies, such
as Marvel, Star Wars, and Pixar. The Mickey Mouse has certainly made its own name
in copyright law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision in Alfred v. Walt Disney,
while consistent with past case law, provides underdogs, such as the Plaintiffs, with
surer footing when entering the pleading stage of copyright infringement cases.
Further, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the lower court erred when it did not
compare the Plaintiff’s screenplay to Disney’s copied final product. Plaintiffs had, in
fact, sufficiently alleged substantial similarities to survive a motion to dismiss.
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IT’S A PIRATE’S LIFE FOR ME: STEALING SCRIPTS INSTEAD OF JEWELS
ALEXA BUECHLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Even in the Supreme Court, the Walt Disney Company is a household name.1 Its
movies are a staple in our society on a national and international level,2 and everyone
is familiar with Mickey Mouse’s ears, which withstand the test of time.3 Commonly
known as “Disney,” the media syndicate owns notable companies, such as ABC,
Marvel, Lucasfilm, and Pixar.4 What you might not know about Disney is that the
company was sued for copyright infringement of one of their landmark franchises:
Pirates of the Caribbean.5
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit were Arthur Lee Alfred, II, Ezequiel Martinez, Jr.,
and Tova Laiter.6 Alfred and Martinez are screenplay writers, and Laiter is a film
producer.7 The Defendant, the Walt Disney Company, is a multinational mass media
and entertainment conglomerate.8 Disney has television shows, motion pictures, radio
stations, and amusement parks.9
In 2000, Alfred and Martinez wrote a pirate screenplay, and submitted it to
Disney.10 Concurrently, Plaintiffs were also working with Disney on another project,
Red Hood. 11 Disney rejected Plaintiffs’ pirate screenplay, but, in 2003, it released
Pirates of the Caribbean: Curse of the Black Pearl.12 Thereafter, Plaintiffs asserted five
copyright infringement claims.13

* © 2022 Alexa Buechler, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2023, UIC School of Law; B.A. in
Journalism and Mass Communication, Arizona State University (2020). I would like to thank my
editor, Marisa Schutz, and the entire Review of Intellectual Property Law staff. I dedicate this article
to every person who taught me how to love writing.
1 See Carly Hallman, Every Company Disney Owns: A Map of Disney’s Worldwide Assets, TITLE
MAX, https://www.titlemax.com/discovery-center/money-finance/companies-disney-owns-worldwide/
(last visited March 24, 2022).
2 Id.
3 See generally Timothy B. Lee, Mickey Mouse will be public domain soon – here’s what that
means, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 1, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/01/a-whole-yearsworth-of-works-just-fell-into-the-public-domain/.
4 Id.
5 Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 821 Fed. App’x. 727, 730 (9th Cir. 2020).
6 See Complaint and Jury Demand, Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., No. 2:18-cv-08074 (D. Colo. 2017),
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cacd.723259/gov.uscourts.cacd.723259.1.0.pdf at
6.
7 Id.
8 See Hallman, supra note 1.
9 Id.
10 Compl., supra note 6, at 6.
11 Id. at 6-7.
12 Id. at 9.
13 Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2019). Plaintiffs asserted five
claims under copyright infringement: (1) Reproduction of Copyrighted Work; (2) Preparation of
Derivative Works; (3) Distribution of Copyrighted Work; (4) Public Performance of Copyrighted Work;
and (5) Public Display of Copyrighted Work.
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Four more movies followed Pirates of the Caribbean: Curse of the Black Pearl: (1)
Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man’s Chest; (2) Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s
End; (3) Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides; and (4) Pirates of the Caribbean:
Dead Men Tell No Tales.14 Plaintiffs claimed that each of these movies infringes upon
their screenplay.15
Plaintiffs had the burden of proof to establish an actionable copyright
infringement claim.16 They were required to show that they owned a valid copyright of
their screenplay, and that Defendant copied protected aspects of their work.17
The California Central District Court granted a motion to dismiss in Disney’s
favor.18 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.19 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion on
Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. is discussed in this case note.20
The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court erred when it failed to compare the
unprotectable elements between the two works and that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
substantial similarities between the two works, enough to survive a motion to
dismiss. 21 It also held that the District Court did not err in refusing to apply the
inverse-ratio rule.22 Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs were correct that pirate films
are entitled to broad protection, but the District Court did not discuss whether the
screenplay was entitled to narrow protection.23
The Ninth Circuit was correct in its opinion. The District Court failed when it did
not compare the two works, and Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged substantial similarities
to survive a motion to dismiss.24 It was appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to uphold the
District Court’s decision to not apply the inverse-ratio rule, and it was appropriate to
afford the screenplay broad copyright protection.25
Section II of this case note will provide the relevant legal foundation necessary
to understand copyright principles, including the 1976 Copyright Act, Nimmer on
Copyrights, and applicable case law. Next, section III of this case note will detail the
background of Alfred v. Walt Disney Co., including a summary of the facts, procedural
history, and holdings. Moreover, section IV will provide an analysis of whether the
Plaintiffs’ screenplay was protectable, whether the protected elements of the Plaintiffs’
screenplay were objectively similar to Defendant’s film, and whether dismissal of the
claim was inappropriate. Finally, section V will reiterate the important points of the
case note.

Id.
Id.
16 Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 631 (2d Cir. 1995).
17 Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
18 Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1191.
19 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 730.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 729-30.
22 Id. at 729-30.
23 Id. at 729-30.
24 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 730.
25 Id.
14
15
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II. DISCUSSION
The United States Constitution’s Patent and Copyright Clause states: “Congress
shall have Power To . . . promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”26 Copyright law is statutory in nature, so Congress passes
laws pursuant to the authority conferred under the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the Constitution. 27 These statutes should be viewed through the lens of Congress’s
purpose and intent.28
In 1976, Congress updated the Copyright Act under Title 17 of the United States
Code to better conform with ongoing technological changes. 29 The Copyright Act of
1976 was the first major change to United States copyright law since 1909, when
motion pictures debuted. 30 Congress realized that this new technology meant that
there would be new methods of reproduction for copyrighted works and new patterns
for business relations among authors.31
The Copyright Act of 1976 protects original works of authorship in the following
categories: “literary works; musical works, including any accompanying words;
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic
works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; sound recordings; and architectural works.”32
The Copyright Act defines “literary works” as works, “other than audiovisual
works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals,
manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks or cards, in which they are embodied.”33
The Copyright Act defines motion pictures as “audiovisual works consisting of a
series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of
motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any.”34
Copyright protection does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” no matter the form that it comes
in however.35 For an author to receive copyright protection, their work must be
original; courts have inferred this requirement from the Copyright Act’s use of the term
“authors” because an author is defined by the Copyright Act as a “creator” or
“originator.”36 Nimmer defines originality as work that “owes its origin to the author,
i.e., work that is independently created rather than copied from other works.”37
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
28 Id. The statutes “ought not to be unduly extended by judicial construction to include privileges
not intended to be conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to deprive those entitled to their benefit of
the rights Congress intended to grant.”
29 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2022).
33 Id. at § 101.
34 Id.
35 Id. at § 102(b).
36 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (2021) (citing
Feist, 499 U.S. at 351-52.)
37 Id. at § 2.01 (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 345).
26
27
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Originality does not require novelty. 38 Backed by congressional intent and
judicial construction, a work should not be denied its copyright protections “simply
because it is substantially similar to a work previously produced by others.” 39 As for
the relation between originality and creativity, in Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, the court stated that originality requires “independent creation” and “just a
scintilla of creativity.” 40 Despite this clarification, many courts use originality and
creativity interchangeably.41
A. The General Copyright Infringement Test
For plaintiffs to successfully bring a copyright infringement suit, they must prove
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original.”42
The second element of the copyright infringement test stems from the originality
requirement discussed above.43 Originality requires the author to create something
independently, without copying from someone else’s work.44 Additionally, producing a
work, without copying, demands at least a small amount of creativity.45 As a result, a
work is considered original if it is “independently created by the author” and “possesses
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”46
These statutory requirements provide a test for the “originality” aspect of the
modern rule seen today in court opinions: “copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original.”47 But, what about copying?

Id. at § 2.01.
Id.; Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Inv. Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’d, 808 F.2d
204 (2d Cir. 1986).
40 See 1 Nimmer, supra note 36, at § 2.01; Luck’s Music Libr., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d
107, 118 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Luck’s Music Libr., Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
41 See 1 Nimmer, supra note 36, at § 2.01.
42 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER , NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.01 (2021); Feist, 499 U.S.
at 361.
43 Feist, 499 U.S. at 358-61.
44 Id. at 358.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 345; Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1212 (2021). In Google LLC, instead
of literary works, the case involved lines of code; however, code is encompassed by copyright because
code is expressed in “words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols,” so they are authored
works. The debate in this opinion partly surrounds whether code can pass the originality requirement
because the lines of code can be created in varying ways.
47 See 4 Nimmer, supra note 42, at § 4.01; Feist, 499 U.S. at 361; L.A. Printex Indus. v.
Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2012); Latin Am. Music Co. v. Media Power Grp., Inc.,
705 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2013); Perea v. Ed. Cultural, Inc., 13 F.4th 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2021).
38
39
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B. The Test for Copying
Usually, direct evidence of copying is unavailable, so a plaintiff must find another
way to establish copying.48 The test is twofold.49 Plaintiffs “can establish copying by
showing (1) that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work; and (2) that the two
works are substantially similar.50
Access to the plaintiff’s work means that the defendant had the opportunity to see
and/or copy the plaintiff’s work. 51 This has been described as a “reasonable
opportunity” or a “reasonable possibility” to examine the work. 52 In other words, it
cannot be “merely a bare possibility” that the defendant had the chance to view the
piece of work.53 Plaintiffs can prove access by either demonstrating “a ‘chain of events’
linking the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s access” or by showing that the work
has been widely disseminated.54
The second prong of the copying test is a showing of substantial similarity between
the two works.55 To determine substantial similarity, the Ninth Circuit analyzes the
works using an extrinsic test and an intrinsic test.56
C. The Extrinsic Test for Substantial Similarity
For the extrinsic test, a plaintiff must demonstrate substantial similarity “as
measured by external, objective criteria.”57 Therefore, when analyzing this part of the
substantial similarity test, courts must look to the protected elements of the
copyrighted work. 58 “It is axiomatic that copyright protects only an author’s
expression, not his ideas.”59
In Tisi v. Patrick, the court demonstrated that a common melody and harmony is
not original enough to qualify as protectable.60 For an author’s work to be protected, it
must have some “distinctive characteristic” and individuality. 61 However, even if
L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 846.
Id.; Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996).
50 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 846; Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218.
51 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977).
52 Id.
53 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 846 (quoting Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Ent. Inc., 581 F.3d
1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009)). There is an exception to this rule. If the two works are “so strikingly
similar as to preclude the possibility of independent creation,” copying can be proven without
demonstrating access, but this is the law in the Second Circuit, not the law in the Ninth Circuit, where
Alfred v. Walt Disney was decided. Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting
Ferguson v. NBC, Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 106768 (2d Cir. 1988)).
54 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 846-47 (quoting Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482).
55 Id. at 841; Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218.
56 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844 (9th
Cir. 2004).
57 Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845.
58 Id.
59 Gaste, 663 F.2d at 1071; Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845.
60 Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
61 Id. (quoting Supreme Rec., Inc. v. Decca Rec., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D. Cal. 1950)).
48
49
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individual aspects of the work are not protected, they may be protected as a
combination.62
The extrinsic test also considers “whether two works share a similarity of ideas
and expression as measured by external, objective criteria” and dissects the work’s
“constituent elements.” 63 This is done by comparing the objective similarities of
“specific expressive elements” between a plaintiff’s work and a defendant’s work. 64
Expert testimony can be particularly helpful in determining whether the similarities
between two works are qualitatively significant.65
If the similarities are only present to “nonessential matters,” then no substantial
similarity should be found. 66 However, this is more reflective when looking at music
samplings, which trend toward having many similarities.67 If, looking at each of the
works as a whole, no reasonable jury would find that the works are substantially
similar using the objective extrinsic test, summary judgment or dismissal is
appropriate.68
D. The Intrinsic Test for Substantial Similarity
The intrinsic test deciphers “whether the ordinary, reasonable person would find
the total concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar.”69 The intrinsic test
is subjective. 70 The factfinder, such as a jury, applies the intrinsic test; the Ninth
Circuit finds that the intrinsic test is “uniquely suited” for determination by the trier
of fact.71
However, at the pleadings stage, the intrinsic test is unnecessary; only the
extrinsic test for substantial similarities is used during the pleadings stage. 72 The
extrinsic test, unlike the intrinsic one, is a matter of law decided by the court because
it does not depend upon the trier of fact.73 Therefore, the extrinsic test is the only
relevant test when a judge is deciding on a motion to dismiss.74

62 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849. The “original selection, coordination, and arrangement”
could turn the unprotected elements into protectable expression. An example of this is in Metcalf v.
Bochco. “Each note in a scale . . . is not protectable, but a pattern of notes in a tune may earn copyright
protection.” Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).
63 Id.
64 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020).
65 Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003).
66 Id. at 1195 (quoting 4 Nimmer § 13.03[A][2]; cf. Warner Bros v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231,
242 (2d Cir. 1983)).
67 Newton, 388 F. 3d at 1195.
68 Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & TV, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994).
69 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485 (quoting Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442
(9th Cir. 1991)).
70 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485.
71 Id.
72 Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018).
73 McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164).
74 Id.
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E. The Inverse-Ratio Rule
The inverse-ratio rule considers the relationship between substantial similarity
and access, but it has been overruled by many circuits.75 The rule dictates that “a lower
standard of proof of substantial similarity” is acceptable when “a high degree of access
is shown.”76 Presently, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected
the inverse-ratio rule.77 The Ninth Circuit, in its Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin decision,
effectively rejected the inverse-ratio rule as well.78 At the trial, Skidmore asked the
judge for an inverse ratio rule instruction, and the judge refused.79 The Ninth Circuit
claimed that “the very nature of the rule spawned uncertainty in its application. 80
Additionally, accessibility has become “increasingly diluted in our digitally
interconnected world… [where] access is often proved by the wide dissemination of the
copyrighted work.”81
F. Broad and Thin Protection of Copyrights
Different types of works are typically entitled to different levels of copyright
protection.82 “The distinction between “thin” and “broad” copyright protection is based
on the principle that copyright protects expressions and not ideas.”83
Historically, ideas, by themselves, are not protected under copyright law, so this
gave an author leeway to copy an idea and incorporate it into his or her work.84 In
Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1065-66.
Id. at 1066; Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 485 (quoting Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218).
77 Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2012) (circuit never endorsed this idea); Positive
Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Rec., Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 371 (5th Cir. 2004); Beal v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 460 (11th Cir. 1994); Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 187-88 (2d
Cir. 1961). The Ninth Circuit in Led Zeppelin looked to the Second Circuit when determining the lack
of logic behind this rule. This opinion allowed for the Ninth Circuit to join the rest of these circuit
court’s rejection of the inverse ratio rule. The Second Circuit stated that “access will not supply
[similarity’s] lack, and an undue stress upon the one feature can only confuse and even conceal this
basic requirement.” Arc Music Corp. 296 F.2d at 187-88.
78 Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d at 1069. Additionally, there was a lot of trouble with applying the
inverse ratio rule because a layperson sitting on the jury would have to understand the rule and apply
it. The Ninth Circuit decided that this was “totally impossible.” Id.
79 Id. at 1066.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1068.
82 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010). This case arose out of a dispute
between the company who produces Barbie dolls (Mattel) and the company who produces Bratz dolls
(MGA Ent.). Apparently, Bryant, the man who created the Bratz dolls, had previously worked at
Mattel. Id.
83 See Dr. Dariush Adli, Commentary: ‘Thin’ vs. ‘Broad’ Protection for Music Works, LAW
JOURNAL NEWSLETTER (June 2018), https://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/2018/06/01/commentar
y-thin-vs-broad-protection-for-music-works/?slreturn=20220810110754. See also Brian Welk, Disney
Settles ‘Pirates of the Caribbean’ Copyright Suit With Writers Who Claimed Film Franchise Was Their
Idea, THE WRAP (Sept. 2, 2022), https://www.thewrap.com/disney-settles-pirates-caribbean-copyrightlawsuit/).
84 Mattel, Inc., 616 F.3d at 913-914. As discussed above, ideas and scenes-a-faire, which means
standard features, are not protected. The creation of a different standard for different works stems
from the fact that there are numerous ways to express ideas. However, sometimes there are less ideas
75
76
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Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., the court explains that there are numerous ways to
make an aliens-attack movie, and thus, works that fall within the same category are
given “broad protection.”85 This means that copyright infringement is present only if
the alleged infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work.86
On the other hand, there is also “thin” copyright protection. 87 The court in Mattel
explains that there are only “so many ways to paint a red bouncy ball on blank
canvas.” 88 Therefore, in cases like Mattel, the copyrighted work must be “virtually
identical” to be considered an infringement.89 Whether a work receives broad or thin
protection determines this standard; then it is applied to both the extrinsic and
intrinsic tests.90
III. THE CASE
Alfred, II, Martinez, Jr., and Laiter filed a claim for copyright infringement
against the Walt Disney Company, stating that their screenplay was substantially
similar to Disney’s Pirates of the Caribbean: Curse of the Black Pearl film.91
Alfred and Martinez wrote a pirate screenplay, and Laiter helped produce it. 92
Around the time of the creation of the screenplay, the trio worked alongside Disney on
a script called Red Hood.93 In August 2000, Plaintiffs handed over a copy of their pirate
screenplay to Brigham Taylor at Disney because he had shown enthusiasm toward the
idea, and the Plaintiffs had worked alongside him for the Red Hood project.94
The Plaintiffs did not hear for many weeks, even though it is industry standard
to hear back with in one to two weeks.95 At this point, the Plaintiffs finally learned
that Disney passed on their screenplay.96 On November 26, 2002, over two years later,
Disney returned the screenplay to the Plaintiffs.97 Then, in July 2003, Pirates of the
Caribbean: Curse of the Black Pearl debuted in theaters, with four movies following.98

available to an author for one type of work than another. An author can go anywhere with a playscript,
but a musical artist must work within the chords he is given.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 914.
88 Id.
89 Mattel, Inc., 616 F.3d at 914.
90 Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in affording broad protection to the dolls
due to the narrow range of “expression on an attractive young, female fashion doll with exaggerated
proportions.” Therefore, the court believed that applying thin copyright protection (using the
“virtually identical” standard) was necessary.
91 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 728.
92 Compl., supra note 6, at 6.
93 Id. at 6-7.
94 Id. at 6-8.
95 Id. at 8.
96 Id. at 9.
97 Compl., supra note 6, at 9.
98 Id. at 9; Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1180. These movies include: Pirates of the Caribbean: Curse
of the Black Pearl. These were Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man’s Chest, Pirates of the Caribbean:
At World’s End, Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides, and Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Men
Tell No Tales.
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The movie and its sequels became a billion-dollar franchise.99 Plaintiffs claimed that
each of these movies infringe upon their pirate screenplay.100
The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed
the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”101 Plaintiffs appealed the court’s dismissal.102 In their
appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss,
abused its discretion in denying them leave to amend their complaint, and abused its
discretion in “taking judicial notice of the Disney World Pirates of the Caribbean theme
park ride as it existed in 2005.”103
The Ninth Circuit published this opinion, deciding upon the following issues: 104
(1) whether the district court failed when it did not compare the unprotectable
elements; (2) whether the two works are substantially similar enough to survive a
motion to dismiss using the objective, extrinsic test; (3) whether the district court erred
in failing to apply the inverse-ratio rule; and (4) whether pirate films are entitled to
broad copyright protection, rather than thin copyright protection.105
The Ninth Circuit detailed the similarities between the Plaintiffs’ pirate
screenplay and the Defendant’s film.106 The two works both included: a prologue with
a setting ten years before the main story begins; an introduction of the main characters
during a battle at gunpoint; treasure stories taking place on islands; caves filled with
jewels and other treasures; skeleton crews or supernaturally cursed pirates; and a
young, rogue pirate yearning for redemption.107 Additionally, both of the scripts share
similarities in dialogue, tone, and theme. 108
Compl., supra note 6, at 6.
Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1180.
101 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 728; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The full rule is “every defense to a claim
for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party
may assert the following defenses by motion … (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”
102 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 728.
103 Id. at 728-30. The Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction over the lower court’s dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court”). The Ninth Circuit does not address whether the district court abused its discretion in either
the amendment or the matter regarding the Disney World theme park ride. The appellate court
deemed these issues moot, but it stated that plaintiffs could try to request leave to amend their
complaint again on remand. The leave to amend rooted in the plaintiffs’ desire to change their
complaints now that they had a chance to review the original scripts of Disney’s movies. Alfred, 388
F. Supp. 3d at 1190-91. The lower court deemed the amendment “futile” because they had not
prevailed under the extrinsic test. Id. at 1191.
104 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 728.
105 Id. at 728-30.
106 Id. at 729.
107 Id. The District Court characterized the idea of cursed pirates as “scenes-a-faire” and
unprotectable. Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1183. The District Court also pointed out that many aspects
of the screenplay featured elements of Defendant’s Pirates of the Caribbean ride. The theme park ride
has skeleton pirates speaking and steering the ship. The participants search for the ‘lost treasure.’
The District Court deemed that the plot upon “closer inspection reveals that they tell very different
stories.” Id. (quoting Benay v. Warner Bros. Ent., Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2010)).
108 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 1174. The two main characters of each of the two authored works do
share similarities as well. Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1185. The defendant’s main character is Jack
Sparrow who is portrayed as funny, cocky, and a drunk who enjoys rum; on the other hand, the
99
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The district court noted these similarities but dismissed the action because it
deemed these traits to be common, unprotected, pirate movie tropes.109 However, the
Ninth Circuit countered this, stating it is difficult to determine whether the elements
are protectable or unprotectable at this point in the litigation.110
The Ninth Circuit believed that these similarities were “qualitatively significant,”
and that more discovery would be required, especially when these works are about
twenty years old.111 The Pirates of the Caribbean franchise could also be considered as
a franchise that set the mold for pirate movie tropes.112
As for the inverse-ratio rule, it was overruled in the Skidmore decision.113 The
Ninth Circuit determined that the inverse-ratio rule “defies logic” and “creates
uncertainty.”114 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not err
when refusing to apply the inverse-ratio rule to this case.115 The Ninth Circuit also
briefly discussed broad versus thin copyright protection. 116 The district court did not
mention thin protection, nor did it require Plaintiffs to show that the two works were
“virtually identical” instead of showing substantial similarity.117
Overall, the Ninth Circuit held the district court erred when it did not compare
the unprotectable elements between the two works, and that there were substantial
similarities, enough to survive a motion to dismiss.118 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed
the lower court’s refusal to apply the inverse-ratio rule.119
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that Plaintiffs were correct about the idea that
pirate films are entitled to broad, not narrow, copyright protection.120 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit cannot determine whether the district court erred because it did not
require a showing that the works are “virtually identical.” 121 The Ninth Circuit
plaintiff’s main character is Davey Jones, who is considered a “dashing young rogue” that is cocky and
brave, but also a drunk. Id. The district court deemed “cockiness, bravery, and drunkenness” as
“generic, non-distinct characteristics.” Id. Therefore, the lower court stated that they are not
protectable. Id. The themes were similar in that there was betrayal; however, plaintiffs’ theme
includes a redemption arc where the main character gives up piracy for love. Id. at 1187-89.
109 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729. The similarities that the District Court deemed “pirate tropes”
include “treasure maps, ghost pirates, ‘the undead,’ the supernatural, ships flying black sails,
skeletons, privateers, naval attacks, dark fog, the ‘pirate code,’ ghosts, and sea monsters.”
110 Id. Discovery and the gathering of additional evidence would help to shed light on what would
likely be considered protectable versus unprotectable. Also, “even when individual elements are not
protected – their ‘original selection, coordination, and arrangement . . . may be protectable [sic]
expression.’” L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d at 849.
111 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729; see also Newton, 388 F.3d at 1196.
112 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729.
113 Id.
114 Id. (quoting Led Zeppelin, 925 F.3d at 1066).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 729-730; Mattel, 616 F.3d at 913-14. Broad protection follows the “substantial similarity”
standard; however, thin protection follows the “virtually identical” standard. In Alfred, the District
Court had not enforced a “virtually identical” standard. Because the lower court had not mentioned
even once that the screenplay should be given thin protection (and therefore must show that the two
works are “virtually identical”), the Ninth Circuit could not conclude whether the lower court had
erred on this point.
117 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729.
118 Id. at 728-29.
119 Id. at 729.
120 Id. at 729-30.
121 Id.
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reversed and remanded the Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. decision back to the district
court.122
On remand, the California Central District Court denied Disney’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.123 Finally, the case concluded with Disney settling.124
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will argue that the Court correctly decided Alfred v. Walt Disney Co.
when it held that Plaintiffs’ screenplay should have survived a motion to dismiss. 125
This section will detail how the two works, Plaintiffs’ screenplay and Defendant’s
Pirates of the Caribbean films, are substantially similar.126
When viewing the similarities between the two works, the Ninth Circuit correctly
decided, based on current case law, that Plaintiffs should survive a motion to
dismiss.127 This section will also argue that Plaintiffs’ screenplay is protectable and
that the protected elements are objectively similar to elements within Defendant’s
films.128
A. Plaintiffs’ Screenplay was Protectable
An idea alone is unprotectable; there must be some originality that goes into the
work.129 Additionally, the “original selection, coordination, and arrangement” could
turn the unprotected elements into protectable expression.130
If courts only examined each separate component of a work to determine its
protectability, it would be very difficult to find a work copyrightable.131 For example,
the court would find “no originality in a painting because all colors of paint have been
used somewhere in the past.”132 Each similarity of Plaintiffs’ screenplay compared to
Defendant’s film franchise should be considered as a whole, instead of each element
being considered individually. Instead of combining reds, blues, and yellows to create
a painting, Plaintiffs created the characteristics of the main character, the skeletons,
and the supernaturally cursed crew.133
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Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 730.
Alfred v. Walt Disney Pictures, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 253308, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16,

123

2021).

See Welk, supra note 83.
Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729. The Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that “[b]ecause
Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that there are substantial similarities between the works to survive
Defendant’s motion-to-dismiss, we reverse the district court’s dismissal and remand.”
126 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 846; Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218.
127 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729.
128 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849.
129 Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
130 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849.
131 Id.
132 Id. (quoting Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995)).
133 Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1183.
124
125
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In L.A. Printex Indus., a designer created a floral fabric design called C30020. 134
This fabric had “a repeating pattern of bouquets of flowers and three-leaf branches.” 135
While the floral fabric design idea is unprotectable, because there are numerous ways
to “combine petals, buds, stems, leaves, and colors” in the design, the combination of
individual elements makes the design protectable.136
Alfred’s screenplay has similarities to Defendant’s Pirates of the Caribbean films,
including a prologue taking place ten years prior to the storyline, the main characters
meeting during a battle over gunpoint, among others. 137 In addition, there are shared
similarities in dialogue and tone. 138 These individual elements may resemble typical
pirate tropes, which are no more than ideas. 139 However, in combination, these
individual elements transform the pirate tropes from unprotectable ideas to a
protected screenplay.140
In Metcalf v. Bochco, the plaintiffs wrote a story about “a county hospital in innercity Los Angeles and the struggles of its predominantly black staff.” 141 The plaintiffs
then transformed the story into a screenplay and pitched it to Bochco and the Columbia
Broadcasting System (“CBS”), but both declined. Eight years later, CBS premiered a
show, produced and written by Bochco, about a “county hospital in inner-city Los
Angeles with a predominantly black staff.”142
Other similarities included themes of “poverty, race relations, and urban blight;”
good looking and muscular surgeons who grew up in the same neighborhood as the
hospital; a struggle to choose between private practice and working in the inner-city;
134 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 845. The design was created by Moon Choi, an L.A. Printex
designer. C30020 is part of a group of five textile designs, called Small Flower Group. The Copyright
Office issued a certificate of registration for it on July 17, 2002.
135 Id. at 850. In 2008, L.A. Printex discovered this pattern on Aeropostale shirts. The President
of L.A. Printex claimed, “the only difference between C30020 and the design on the Aeropostale shirts
is that the latter was printed using cruder, lower-quality techniques and machinery.”
136 Id. at 850-51. It is because there are a multitude of ways to design a floral pattern that makes
it possible for this combination to become protectable. In contrast, there are a “limited number of ways
to . . . ‘paint a red bouncy ball on black canvas.’”
137 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729. Further similarities include jewel-filled caves, betrayal of a
former first mate, and skeleton crews. This is not an extensive list of the similarities found between
the two works.
138 Id. Plaintiffs claim that dialogues from the screenplay were copied practically verbatim into
Pirates of the Caribbean; Compl., supra note 6, at 10.
139 Id. The District Court thought that the two works only shared unprotectable material and that
all of the similarities between Plaintiffs’ screenplay and Defendant’s films were simply generic tropes
found in every pirate movie.
140 Id. This argument is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion: “the selection and
arrangement of the similarities between them is more than de minimis.” The court and this case note
rely upon the opinion of L.A Printex Indus. to come to this conclusion by applying the rule that an
“original selection, coordination, and arrangement . . . may be protectable [sic] expression.” L.A.
Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849.
141 Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1071. The writers Jerome and Laurie Metcalf wanted to develop their
story into a screenplay for a motion picture. The Metcalfs wrote a project summary to present to
Bochco. Bochco liked it, but he declined due to lack of time. CCA, the Metcalf’s corporation, hired
someone to write a screenplay. Bochco rejected the screenplay again for the same reason: he was too
busy with other projects. The Metcalfs revised the screenplay and submitted it to Bochco and CBS.
Both rejected the screenplay. CBS denied it because it already had a hospital series being developed.
This was in 1992. In 2000, CBS aired a television show, called “City of Angels,” produced by Bochco,
featuring an inner-city hospital in Los Angeles with a predominantly black staff.
142 Id. at 1072.
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romance with a young, professional woman and the hospital administrator leading to
conflict; and a hospital “bid for reaccreditation [that] is vehemently opposed by a
Hispanic politician.”143 The Ninth Circuit held that these elements were protectable
due to “the presence of so many generic similarities and the common patterns in which
they arise.”144
In Alfred, the plot and sequence of events have similarities to Defendant’s Pirates
of the Caribbean films, such as supernaturally cursed pirates with skull faces, ships
flying black sails, naval attacks, dark fog, the ‘pirate code,’ ghosts, and sea monsters. 145
The main characters in both of the works are “funny, not feared,” referred to frequently
as a “good man,” cocky but has a “heart of gold,” and a drunk who loves rum.146
Both works have a rival, described as sinister, pale, wearing a black baroque
pirate suit, and who is “charismatic but in an evil way.” 147 This rivalry started out as
friendship, captain and first mate, before one of them betrays the other. 148
Additionally, Plaintiffs can also point to similar dialogue and themes. 149
Plaintiffs’ plight was comparable to the Metcalf’s circumstances. The similarities
create a lengthy, and incomplete, list of unprotected elements, which becomes
protected when joined together.150 The love triangle in the Metcalf’s screenplay would
be considered an unprotected element because love triangles are commonly found in
various forms of media.151 However, the love triangle is protectable in combination
with other elements included in the work. There are numerous pirate tropes, many of
which were created by Pirates of the Caribbean; however, the combination of these
elements transforms the work from an unprotectable idea to protectable expression. 152
When executing its analysis, the District Court separated these elements, looking
at the characters, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, and pace individually, as opposed to
Id. at 1073-74.
Id. at 1074.
145 Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1183. The District Court concluded by using an objective analysis
that the plot and sequence of each of these elements are not similar. The defendant’s film is focused
on finding and returning treasure, and the plaintiffs’ screenplay focuses on merely finding the
treasure. However, both the Plaintiffs’ screenplay and the Defendant’s films are about breaking a
curse which is the main plot point of both the defendant’s first film of the Pirates of the Caribbean
series and the Plaintiffs’ screenplay.
146 Id. at 1185.
147 Id. at 1185-86. The two characters, the Defendant’s Captain Barbossa and Plaintiffs’ Jack
Nefarious, are not considered “bargainers” either. The District Court stated that this was an
inaccurate similarity, but without further discovery, it would be difficult to come to this conclusion.
148 Id. at 1186.
149 Id. at 1187-88. There is a common motif between the two works: ten years in time. Plaintiffs’
screenplay consistently uses “ten years.” Defendant’s film has the Flying Dutchman only allowed on
land once every ten years. There are also themes of betrayal and mutiny. Plaintiffs allege “extended
similarity in dialogue.” The District Court states in one breath that Plaintiffs failed to prove this and,
in another breath, deny Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint after seeing the original
scripts used by Defendant for its films. Id. at 1191.
150 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729; L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849.
151 Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1073-74. The Ninth Circuit stated that the “similarities proffered by the
Metcalfs are not protectable when considered individually; they are either too generic or constitute
‘scenes à faire.’” Specifically, the court used these as examples: “One cannot copyright the idea of an
idealistic young professional choosing between financial and emotional reward, or of love triangles
among young professionals that eventually become strained, or of political forces interfering with
private action.”
152 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729.
143
144
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viewing the elements collectively. 153 This analysis contradicts the rule that the
“original selection, coordination, and arrangement” could turn the unprotected
elements into protectable expression.154
Plaintiffs’ work should be protected because it satisfies the first prong of the
objective, extrinsic test for substantial similarity. 155 In combination, these elements
are more than just common ideas.156
B. The Protected Elements are Objectively Similar to Defendant’s Film
The second prong of the extrinsic test considers “whether two works share a
similarity of ideas and expression as measured by external, objective criteria” and
analyzes the work’s “constituent elements.”157
In Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & TV, the plaintiff wrote a screenplay, which he
argued was similar to the defendant’s film, Honey, I Shrunk the Kids.158 However, the
Ninth Circuit disagreed because the defendant Disney’s film and the plaintiff’s
screenplay had “substantially different plots, themes, and sequences of events.” 159 The
characters were shrunk to different sizes, and the method of shrinking was different
as well.160 Additionally, Honey, I Shrunk the Kids demonstrates family values, and the
plaintiff’s work has a theme of the “triumph of good over evil.”161
At first glance, Kouf and Alfred might seem comparable because the main
characters’ endings in the respective works are dissimilar. 162 Plaintiffs’ main
character, Davey Jones, renounces piracy while Jack Sparrow, Defendant’s main
character, does not. 163 Also, some of the plot points between the two works are
different.164 In Pirates of the Caribbean: Curse of the Black Pearl, pirates are seeking

Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1183-90.
L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849.
155 Id.; Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117; Gaste, 663 F.2d at 1071; Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845.
156 Gaste, 663 F.2d at 1071; Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845.
157 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849.
158 Kouf, 16 F.3d at 1043.
159 Id. at 1045.
160 Id. In Honey, I Shrunk the Kids the main characters shrink to a quarter inch, and the main
characters in the plaintiff’s screenplay shrink to one foot. In Disney’s film, the main characters become
smaller by means of a ray gun machine, and the shrinking was an accident. By contrast, in the
plaintiff’s screenplay, the characters purposely shrink after consuming a liquid formula. Also, in the
Disney film, the characters shrink once, while in the plaintiff’s screenplay the characters shrink
multiple times.
161 Id. Honey, I Shrunk the Kids emphasizes family values, such as “love between spouses, parents
and children, and neighbors.” The plaintiff’s screenplay has tough guys, and the main characters
triumph against the antagonists. This also leads to different conclusions between the two works. At
the end of Honey, I Shrunk the Kids, the scene depicts a happy family, and at the end of the plaintiff’s
screenplay, the gangsters are dead.
162 Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1185.
163 Id. Plaintiffs’ Davey Jones gives up piracy and the treasure he is hunting all in the name of
love, while Defendant’s main character, Jack Sparrow, does not have a love interest and continues his
life as a pirate.
164 Id. at 1184.
153
154
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to return the treasure to break the curse. 165 On the other hand, in Plaintiffs’
screenplay, Davey Jones is searching for the treasure like a typical pirate.166
This is a surface-level comparison of the two works. In reality, the two main
characters are at odds with each other over treasure.167 Undoubtedly, what they are
fighting over is different.168 Defendant’s main characters are fighting over the Black
Pearl, while Plaintiffs’ characters are fighting over a map. However, it is still a
treasure in each of these characters’ eyes.169
Once the supernaturally cursed pirates, the tentacled sea monster, and the
attributes of the main character and his rival are taken into consideration, there are
significantly more similarities between Plaintiff Alfred’s screenplay and Defendant
Disney’s Pirates of the Caribbean movie than the similarities between the movie
Honey, I Shrunk the Kids and Kouf’s screenplay. Pirates of the Caribbean and
Plaintiffs’ screenplay share more than a “compilation of random similarities scattered
throughout the works.”170
While there are differences between the two works, the similarities are more than
enough to survive a motion to dismiss.171
C. Dismissal was Inappropriate
It is rare for copyright infringement cases to be dismissed at the pleadings stage,
but that was what happened in Alfred.172 Typically, dismissal occurs at the summary
judgment stage, after discovery occurs.173 Dismissal is considered appropriate in the
pleading stage if discovery is unneeded because the two works are properly before the
court, so they can be examined and compared.174
In Rentmeester v. Nike, the Ninth Circuit compared two photos to determine
whether they were substantially similar.175 The court was able to consider dismissal
during the pleadings stage because it had both photos available for examination. 176
Id.
Id. at 1184.
167 Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1185.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Kouf, 16 F.3d at 1045.
171 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729.
172 Id. at 728. “Rentmeester contends that dismissal at the pleading stage is rarely appropriate
in copyright infringement cases.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1123.
173 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1123. This does not mean that dismissal cannot happen during the
pleadings stage.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1115-23. This case involved a 1984 photograph of Michael Jordan “leaping toward a
basketball hoop with a basketball raised above his head in his left hand, as though he is attempting
to dunk the ball.” Rentmeester, the photographer, had instructed Jordan on the specific pose he
wanted. This pose was “inspired by ballet’s grand jeté, in which a dancer leaps with legs extended,
one foot forward and the other back.” Rentmeester took the photo from below Jordan at the top of the
jump, so “that the viewer looks up at Jordan’s soaring figure silhouetted against a cloudless blue sky.”
Then, Nike had Michael Jordan do the same pose as part of its marketing campaign.
176 Id. at 1119-23. The Ninth Circuit determined that Nike was not liable for copyright
infringement of Rentmeester’s photograph. “With novels, plays, and motion pictures . . . even after
filtering out unprotectable elements like ideas and scenes à faire, many protectable elements of
165
166
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This was not the case in Alfred.177 The Ninth Circuit was correct in believing that
“additional evidence would help inform the question of substantial similarity.” 178
Plaintiffs’ screenplay and Defendant’s films are not two photographs that the court can
easily hold side-by-side to determine substantial similarity.179
Expert testimony is typically necessary to aid courts in “determining whether the
similarities plaintiffs identify are qualitatively significant.” 180 Alfred and his coplaintiffs did not reach the discovery stage in litigation. 181 In other words, experts were
not called to determine whether the similarities between Plaintiffs’ screenplay and
Defendant’s films are “qualitatively significant.” 182 Therefore, dismissal was
inappropriate because the Court did not have enough information, without expert
testimony, to determine substantial similarity.183
expression remain that can be objectively compared . . . photographs cannot be dissected into
protected and unprotected elements in the same way.” The Ninth Circuit admitted that Michael
Jordan’s pose was one of the “highly original elements” of the photo, but the court held that
Rentmeester “cannot copyright the pose itself and thereby prevent others from photographing a
person in the same pose.”
177 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729.
178 Id.
179 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1118. Sometimes, photos are also entitled to only thin copyright
protection “because the range of creative choices available in selecting and arranging the photo’s
elements is quite limited.” Due to this, even the subtlest differences make two photos non-infringing.
On the other hand, movies are typically given broad protection.
180 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1196. In this case, the plaintiff was fighting summary judgment, arguing
that the experts’ testimony created “a genuine issue of material fact on the substantiality of the
copying.” Jazz flutist, James W. Newton had composed a “six-second, three-note segment,” and the
defendants, a musical group known as the Beastie Boys, used this composition. The District Court
held that the segment was original but not actionable because it was de minimis. The Ninth Circuit
agreed after reviewing the expert testimony.
181 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729. The Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal,
and this type of dismissal occurs during the pleading stage. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), supra note 101.
Pleading stage occurs before the discovery stage, and it will not consider matters outside of the
pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). Otherwise, it would have to be treated as a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Id.
182 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729-30; Newton, 388 F.3d at 1196. The Ninth Circuit was correct in
its opinion that expert testimony would be useful in Alfred because both of the individual pieces are
almost twenty years old, and the “Pirates of the Caribbean film franchise may itself have shaped what
are now considered pirate-movie tropes.” This concerns stems from protectability. Pirate movie tropes
are considered scènes à faire, but if the Pirates of the Caribbean film franchise created those tropes,
and Disney infringed upon Alfred and co-plaintiffs’ copyright, then the issue becomes even more
complicated. The Ninth Circuit sees the value in having experts dissect both the Plaintiffs’ work and
Disney’s end-product to determine whether the elements at issue are more than a trope. This speaks
to how discovery is necessary in this case. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit did not make any decision
on whether the lower court should allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaints now that they had the
chance to view the scripts used by Defendant, but they left the option open on remand.
183 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729. This could be considered as a huge win for the Plaintiffs because
they now stand a chance of standing up to a huge multimedia conglomerate that has a history of
unchecked copyright infringement. Compl., supra note 6, at 10. Plaintiffs alleged that “Defendant’s
unauthorized copying and appropriation of ‘The Screenplay’ is just another misappropriation of
intellectual property of others in their longstanding history of copying other’s original material.” Id.
The Complaint also alleges that The Lion King, Toy Story, Monsters, Inc., Up, Frozen, Inside Out, and
Zootopia are potential infringements. Id. Alfred and co-plaintiffs are standing up to a defendant that
has “a long history of disregarding Copyright law and making a tremendous profit without
compensating the very individuals that created these original expressions.” Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Keeping the analysis illustrated above in mind, the Ninth Circuit Court correctly
decided Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. when it held that Plaintiffs’ screenplay should have
survived a motion to dismiss.184 Plaintiffs’ screenplay and Defendant’s Pirates of the
Caribbean franchise were, in fact, substantially similar, and therefore, should have
survived Defendant’s motion to dismiss.185
As detailed above, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is consistent with current case
law.186 In accordance with case law, Plaintiffs’ screenplay was protectable, despite the
number of pirate tropes it includes. 187 Furthermore, these protected elements are
objectively similar to Defendant’s Pirates of the Caribbean film.188 Therefore, dismissal
by the district court was inappropriate.189
Additionally, public policy dictates that Plaintiffs’ copyright infringement suit
should survive a motion to dismiss. 190 The district court examined Plaintiffs’
screenplay in separate components, but if every court were to do this, it would be
difficult to find any work copyrightable.191
Hopefully, when looking to the future of copyright law, we can see further
accountability of big names, such as the Walt Disney Company. 192 Disney is a multibillion-dollar company that runs multiple industries with an iron first. 193 It is a media
conglomerate that has a troublesome history with copyright infringement claims.194
In Plaintiffs’ initial complaint, they pointed to The Lion King, Toy Story, Monsters,
Inc., Up, Frozen, Inside Out, and Zootopia as examples of potential copyright

184 Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x. at 729. “Plaintiffs sufficiently allege[d] that there are substantial
similarities between the works to survive Defendant’s motion-to-dismiss, we reverse the district
court’s dismissal and remand.”
185 Id.; L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 846; Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218.; Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at
1123.
186 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849; Kouf, 16 F.3d at 1045; Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1071-74;
Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1123.
187 Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 549; L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849. There was originality found
to be in Plaintiffs’ screenplay because the “original selection, coordination, and arrangement” turned
the unprotected elements into protectable expression. L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849; Alfred, 821
Fed. App’x. at 729.
188 Kouf, 16 F.3d at 1043-45. The analysis section details how objectively there are similarities
between the work’s “constituent elements.” L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849.
189 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1123. As stated above, it is rare for dismissal of copyright
infringement to occur at the pleading stage, which is what happened in Alfred. Alfred, 821 Fed. App’x.
at 728.
190 Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1123; L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849.
191 Alfred, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1183-90; L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849. Instead, the lower
court in Alfred analyzed the characters, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, and pace individually. This
contradicts the public policy of seeing a work to determine copyright infringement protectability.
192 Compl., supra note 6, at 10. Copyright rules should be made with the need for “diverse forms
of expression from diverse creators.” See Cory Doctorow, In Serving Big Company Interests, Copyright
Is
In
Crisis,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Jan.
21,
2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/01/serving-big-company-interests-copyright-crisis. This becomes
problematic when looking at big names, such as Disney.
193 See Hallman, supra note 1.
194 Compl., supra note 6, at 10. There is certainly hope on behalf of the Plaintiffs and artists like
them can stand against media giants such as Disney or Amazon. See also Doctorow, supra note 192.

[22:112 2022]

It’s a Pirate’s Life for Me: Stealing Scripts Instead of Jewels 129

infringements by Defendant.195 Due to this extensive history, public interest would be
best served by allowing discovery to determine if the discovery process leads to a fuller
picture of the claim before the Court.196 Perhaps the Plaintiffs in Alfred will inspire
further action against the media conglomerate, but only time will tell.197
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alfred allows future plaintiffs a chance to stand
up to companies that hold an enormous amount of power.198 On the other hand, the
decision does so without expanding the law and opening the door to future frivolous
claims.199 Therefore, when looking at the full picture, the Ninth Circuit’s holdings are
correct.

Compl., supra note 6 at 10.
Id.
197 Id. See generally Brooks Barnes, Disney Sues to Keep Complete Rights to Marvel Characters,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/24/business/media/disney-marvelcopyright-lawsuits.html. Walt Disney is currently trying to defend its rights to huge money-making
characters like Iron Man, Spider-Man, and Thor, but also characters like Doctor Strange, Black
Widow, Hawkeye, Captain Marvel, Falcon, Blade, and the Wizard. It would seem that Disney is
constantly fighting some type of copyright battle.
198 Id.
199 L.A. Printex Indus., 676 F.3d at 849; Kouf, 16 F.3d at 1045; Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1071-74;
Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1123. The Ninth Circuit limits frivolous claims by staying consistent with
the current case law.
195
196

